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Education is one of the most important predictors—usually, in fact, the most im-
portant predictor—of many forms of political and social engagement—from voting to 
chairing a local committee to hosting a dinner party to trusting others. Over the last 
half century (and more) educational levels in the United States have risen sharply. 
In 1960 only 41 percent of American adults had graduated from high school; in 1998 
82 percent had. In 1960 only 8 percent of American adults had a college degree; in 
1998 24 percent had. Yet levels of political and social participation have not risen 
pari passu with this dramatic increase in education, and by some accounts [Putnam, 
1995a; 1995b; 2000] have even fallen. For at least two decades, political scientists 
have mused about this paradoxical “puzzle” [Brody, 1978].
Recently, however, Norman Nie, Jane Junn, and Kenneth Stehlik-Barry [1996, 
hereafter NJS-B] have offered an elegant and potentially powerful resolution to this 
paradox, beginning with a crucial distinction between the “relative” and “absolute” 
effects of education. If more people now have a college degree, they argue, perhaps 
the sociological signiﬁ  cance of the credential has been devalued. Social status is, for 
example, associated with education, but we would not assume that just because more 
Americans are educated than ever before, America has a greater volume of social sta-
tus than ever before. To the extent that education is merely about sorting people, not 
about adding to their skills and knowledge and civic values, then no puzzle remains 
to be explained. In fact, NJS-B conclude, participation is affected primarily by relative 
educational levels, and thus has not been (and should not have been expected to be) 
rising with aggregate educational levels.
The distinction that NJS-B have introduced is important. Education has external 
effects, as well as internal ones. In principle, my behavior can be affected not only by 
my education, but also by that of others around me. The core issue is whether (holding 
constant my own education), I am more likely or less likely to participate politically 
and socially if those around me become more educated. Besides its academic inter-2 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
est, the NJS-B conclusion has practical signiﬁ  cance. If the negative effects of average 
education match or exceed the positive effects of absolute education, then raising 
educational levels is a pointless or even counter-productive way to increase civic en-
gagement. Another way of putting this point, more familiar to economists, would be 
that the coefﬁ  cient on average education provides an estimate of the external effects 
of increases in education. If there are no external effects, then the average level of 
education would attract a zero coefﬁ  cient, and all of the consequences of education 
would be revealed by the effect ﬂ  owing through one’s own education. If average educa-
tion takes a negative coefﬁ  cient, then the external effects of education are negative. 
If the negative effects on average education are as large as the positive effects on 
the own-education variable, as found by NJS-B for participation, then the negative 
externalities are so large as to fully offset the own-education effects, so that economy-
wide increases in education would have no effect on participation. By contrast, if the 
coefﬁ  cient of average education is positive, as NJS-B and we ﬁ  nd for trust, and we 
ﬁ  nd for most forms of participation, then education has positive externalities.
The possible existence of positive or negative externalities from education, with 
respect to the accumulation of social capital is parallel to the long-studied issue of the 
effects of education on the accumulation of human capital. The basic human capital 
model [Becker, 1964] argues that education is of value to individuals because of its 
impact on their knowledge and skills. By contrast, the signalling model [Spence, 
1974] suggests that education is instead valuable to employers and employees as a 
sorting device, just as NJS-B argue is the case for education and social engagement. 
Recent progress in this debate has relied on the use of natural experiments and in-
strumental variables methods [Card, 2001] to assess the income effects of education, 
and to search for external effects. The results of this research tend to favour the hu-
man capital model over the sorting model, and to support the possibility of positive 
economic externalities from education [Moretti, 2004]. 
Since the working paper version of this paper was written [Helliwell and Putnam, 
2001], some research has used instrumental variables to estimate the effects of own-
education on social engagement (see, for example, Milligan, Moretti and Oreopoulos 
[2004] and Dee [2004]), and the results have shown, consistent with the results in 
NJS-B and our own work, that individuals with more education tend to be more en-
gaged citizens. But to test the NJS-B contention that these individual-level effects are 
reversed by negative contextual-level effects requires direct estimation of a relative 
education model, as done by NSJ-B and in this paper1. 
It is important to search for evidence of positive or negative externalities from 
education, since the presumption of positive externalities provides important theo-
retical underpinning for public support of higher education. The NSJ-B analysis 
ﬁ  nds positive externalities for social trust, and negative ones for various types of 
social engagement, a mixed message. The latter ﬁ  nding drew our attention because 
it seemed to contradict what we and others had been ﬁ  nding for the individual and 
community-level effects of education on the accumulation of social capital. We decided 
to investigate the sources of these differing results, to attempt a reconciliation, and, 
most importantly, to try to settle the question of whether education has positive or 
negative externalities for the accumulation of social capital. This paper presents the 3 EDUCATION AND SOCIAL CAPITAL
results of that reconciliation. When appropriate deﬁ  nitions for relative education 
are used, we ﬁ  nd that the contextual effects of education on social participation are 
generally positive, and never signiﬁ  cantly negative, even in using the same data and 
basic equations used by NSJ-B. We have also been able to conﬁ  rm our ﬁ  ndings by 
replication in the context of several large samples of survey data not available when 
the ﬁ  rst version of this paper was written. 
When we began our reconciliation, we ﬁ  rst discovered that the NSJ-B ﬁ  nding 
of negative externalities from education, with respect to social participation, ﬂ  owed 
entirely from their rather special, and we think theoretically inappropriate, deﬁ  ni-
tion of “relative education”. Both spatially and temporally, the operational standard 
adopted by NJS-B [1996, 119 and 227-233] is puzzling. Spatially, by using national 
standards, NJS-B in effect assume that my civic behavior is affected by educational 
levels in communities on the other side of the continent. Logically, this operationali-
zation means that civic participation in Seattle—voting, group membership, and so 
on—should tend to fall if educational levels in rural North Carolina rise. Indeed, the 
operationalization adopted by NJS-B assumes that the effect of education in rural 
North Carolina on Seattle participation rates is fully as great as the effect of education 
levels in Seattle itself. In some domains—the job market for astronauts [NJS-B, 174], 
for example—educational externalities may be undiluted by distance, but whether 
participation in community affairs is like that is, we believe, worth exploring. So we 
propose to measure relative education relative to the respondent’s census region.2
Temporally, by comparing each respondent’s education to the level of education of 
all Americans who were between 25 and 50 years of age when the respondent reached 
the age of 25, NSJ-B assume a static, backward-looking measure of educational ex-
ternalities. In some job markets, this may perhaps be a reasonable assumption, but 
in civic participation it seems implausible. For example, this operational measure of 
relative education means that the participation rate of a 55-year-old is inﬂ  uenced not 
at all by the educational credentials of her 54-year-old neighbors, but is inﬂ  uenced 
instead by the educational credentials of people long dead. In other words, in NSJ-B’s 
oddly asymmetric world of civic competition, no one ever competes against anyone 
younger, but everyone always competes against everyone older (including the dead). 
Here, instead, we propose to compare each respondent’s education to all other living 
adults, both older and younger.3
In short, while it seems to us well worth investigating whether the civic participation 
of a Seattle high school drop-out is inﬂ  uenced (positively or negatively) by the educational 
levels of his neighbors, it seems to us implausible to assume that his participation rate 
is equally or more inﬂ  uenced by the educational level of dead North Carolinians.
One special reason for caution regarding the NSJ-B implementation of their impor-
tant theoretical insight is (as they fully recognize at [NSJ-B, 134]) that since national 
educational levels have risen monotonically throughout this century, operationally 
NSJ-B’s measure of relative education (deﬁ  ned as it is in national and static terms) 
is virtually a perfect linear transform of the respondent’s year of birth.4 Thus, there 
is the risk that this operational deﬁ  nition of relative education might falsely take 
credit for many other factors that have also been changing nationwide and affecting 
generations differently.4 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
In this paper we conﬁ  rm the NJS-B's results showing that education has positive 
externalities with respect to trust. However, we ﬁ  nd that the NSJ-B's results show-
ing average education to have negative effects on participation disappear if a more 
theoretically appropriate deﬁ  nition of the educational environment is employed. 
ARE THE EFFECTS OF EDUCATION RELATIVE OR ABSOLUTE?
The basic theory underlying the NJS-B hypothesis is that education is for many 
activities a sorting mechanism used to distribute a ﬁ  xed number of opportunities for 
gainful participation. Thus more education for an individual makes him or her better 
able and more likely to compete for a place of inﬂ  uence and activity, while increases 
in general education have no such effect. They argue that this relative education 
hypothesis has no claim to universal applicability, and recognize that, at least for 
some activities and attitudes, increases in average education levels may well have 
positive effects. They distinguish three main alternatives: a purely relative effect, as 
described above; an absolute effect, whereby the education effect depends only on an 
individual’s own education and not on the education levels of others; and a cumula-
tive effect, whereby there are positive feedbacks from general education levels to the 
individual’s own actions or attitudes. 
They test among these possibilities by deﬁ  ning separate variables for an individ-
ual’s own education, and for the average level of education in the individual’s “edu-
cational environment,” as deﬁ  ned above. If the positive effects of one’s own education 
are offset by equal and opposite effects from the average education level, then the 
relative education model dominates. If one’s own education has a positive effect, with 
no signiﬁ  cant effect from the average level of education, then the absolute or additive 
model dominates. Positive effects from both own education and average education 
would provide evidence favouring the cumulative model, where the effects of educa-
tion are super-additive, since education has both direct and indirect positive effects. 
Mixed cases are of course possible.
Their reasoning and empirical results provide them with examples of each type 
of effect in operation. For political and social engagement they argue that the relative 
education model should well dominate, because of a relatively ﬁ  xed amount of total 
beneﬁ  ts from participation. For cognitive abilities, they ﬁ  nd a large positive effect of 
own education, combined with a relatively small negative feedback from average edu-
cation levels.5 They see the predominance of the own-education effect as reasonable, 
because education can increase one person’s cognitive skills without lowering those 
of anyone else. This, they argue, is in contrast with political and social participation, 
where increased participation by one is expected to reduce the gains available to oth-
ers, because of competition for a ﬁ  xed pool of beneﬁ  ts. They ﬁ  nd, for organizational 
memberships, that each year of own-education has a substantial positive effect, but 
that this is offset by an even larger negative effect from each year of increase in aver-
age education levels [NSJ-B, 1996, 163]. For tolerance, they ﬁ  nd that one’s tolerance 
is increased not only by one’s own education but also by the average education level 
of those in the surrounding community. They ﬁ  nd that both own-education and aver-
age education have signiﬁ  cant positive effects, with the effects of average education 
being even larger than those for own education [NSJ-B, 1996, 148]. 5 EDUCATION AND SOCIAL CAPITAL
The theoretical argument supporting the possible ﬁ  nding of cumulative or su-
per-additive effects of education can also be made when social trust is the dependent 
variable. Higher average education levels may help to create a climate of trust that 
is self-reinforcing. If individuals know that higher education levels make others more 
likely to be trusting (and perhaps also more trustworthy), then they are in turn more 
likely to trust others. Hence the returns to trusting behaviour are increased where 
there are increases in average levels of education, so that it should be expected that 
people of any level of education are in fact more trusting of others in an environment 
marked by higher average education levels.
Going further, we argue that the same theoretical reasoning can be used equally 
well to support a ﬁ  nding of cumulative or super-additive effects of education for many 
types of social interaction, including political and community engagement. When decid-
ing whether we want to participate in clubs or community life, are we not more likely 
to ﬁ  nd such activities personally and socially rewarding if there is a climate of trust 
and tolerance among those with whom we are working? It is fairly well established 
that high levels of trust reduce the costs of getting things done, since in the absence 
of trust it is necessary to have rules and enforcement that provide expensive and 
cumbersome insurance that the agreed purposes of the organization will be pursued 
as hoped and expected. This will be true even if the number of leadership positions in 
such organizations does not increase proportionately with membership, and even if 
some organizations may have to compete harder for opportunities to make their way 
if the ﬁ  eld becomes more crowded. 
Moreover, it is likely that for some types of organization the opportunities for ben-
eﬁ  cial involvement by individuals may actually increase with the extent of involvement 
by others. For instance, a reading group is more likely to be of interest if there are 
other members with educated interests in the same issues. Likewise, participation in 
a community sports team will be more attractive if there are enough clubs and teams 
to make up a good schedule of games with comparable teams. Even the leadership 
point may cut both ways. Some organizations have jobs to do that are widely regarded 
as important, while individuals would in general prefer that someone else does the 
work. One example may be provided by home and school organizations. These may 
not even exist without a sufﬁ  ciently large and committed group of interested parents, 
so in this case we might expect that I am actually more likely to participate in such 
organizations if educational levels around me increase. 
But beyond some point, especially where there is a given task to be done, one 
might expect the relative education model to come into play. After some point, any 
increase in the number of interested and able parents may diminish the need for 
any particular parent to be involved without thereby threatening the ability of the 
organization to do its job to general satisfaction. This might lead to a negative effect, 
after some point, in the effects of average education on participation. This need not 
reﬂ  ect increased competition for the number of available positions, but could instead 
signal the favourable effects of a larger pool of available volunteers. 
Leadership roles in community organizations may not be prizes for which there 
is competition, but jobs that are taken by those willing to take their turn or do their 
share to keep valuable activities moving along. Thus one may be grateful that someone 6 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
else is able and public-spirited enough to do the organizing of the local sports club, and 
be more inclined to join if the club has a larger group of potential helpers with whom 
to share the job of arranging the schedules and teams. This would provide another 
reason for anticipating that average education levels might have positive rather than 
negative effects for at least some types of group memberships.
For us, it is thus an open question, in terms of theory, whether education effects 
should be relative, additive, or super-additive, for different types of trust and partici-
pation. We agree with NJS-B that the case for expecting cumulative or super-additive 
effects may be greater for trust and tolerance than for some types of participation. 
Thus we think it is important to consider a number of different types of participation, 
as well as to use multiple sources of primary data. Our results, presented in the next 
section, are much more optimistic than those found by NJS-B, because we ﬁ  nd much 
less evidence of relative education effects. We ﬁ  nd large and pervasive positive effects 
of general education increases on levels of trust and participation. While NJS-B ﬁ  nd 
that increases in average education have no net effect on social engagement (i.e., the 
positive own-effects are offset by negative effects from the rising educational environ-
ment), we ﬁ  nd that social engagement increases with average levels of education. We 
will therefore be able to make the more optimistic conclusion that education can be 
seen as increasing rather than merely redistributing social capital.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section we present results on the effects of own and average education 
levels on measures of both trust and participation, using pooled time-series and cross-
sectional data from the US General Social Survey (GSS) from 1972 through 19966, 
and from the DDB-Needham Life Style survey data from 1975 through 1997. The 
advantage of both data sources is that they cover a large enough span of years, with 
enough individual observations in each year that there is some possibility of disen-
tangling the complex interplay of generational, cohort and individual factors affecting 
trends in trust and participation. The GSS employs interviews with randomly selected 
samples, while DDB uses annual written mail questionnaires of a recruited panel of 
participants. Although the demographic makeup, questions, and survey procedures 
differ between the two surveys, the trends evident in the two bodies of data are strik-
ingly similar, thus increasing the assurance that our conclusions are not a result of 
speciﬁ  c features of the methods and questions used in a particular survey. The GSS 
data have also been used by NJS-B and many other researchers, while the DDB data 
provide a fresh set of observations. 
We look ﬁ  rst at the effects of education on measures of social trust, and then 
deal with measures of social engagement. The social trust ﬁ  ndings are in Table 1, 
which shows the results from equations with fully speciﬁ  ed controls as well as from 
stripped-down equations based only on individual and average levels of education, 
controlling only for a possible time trend. As described above, the measure used for 
average education differs in two important ways from that used by NJS-B, ﬁ  rst by 
restricting the comparison group to those in the census region in which the respondent 
lives, and second by permitting the comparison group to change as time progresses. 
We do this by deﬁ  ning the educational environment as the average education levels 
of all adult respondents to the same survey in the respondent’s census region. As we 7 EDUCATION AND SOCIAL CAPITAL
have noted, an important statistical beneﬁ  t of making the comparison speciﬁ  c to the 
census region is that the variable then has more variation among respondents in the 
same time period, and is therefore likely to be free of contamination from correlation 
with other national time trends that may inﬂ  uence trust and participation.7 
 TABLE  1
  Comparing GSS and DDB Evidence on Social Trust
Equation (i)  (ii)  (iii) (iv) (v)  (vi)
 GSS  DDB  DDB  GSS  DDB  DDB
 1972-96  1975-97  1975-97  1972-96  1975-97  1975-97
Sample 22445  76156  76156  22445  76156  76156
Dependent variable: Trust  Honest  Honest  Trust  Honest  Honest
     (binary)      (binary)
  Equations with full control variables  Simple equations with year effects
Education in years  .0439  .0093  .0175  .0391  .0062  .0133
  (40.3) (24.4) (24.8)  (37.0) (16.0)  (18.7)
Average  education  .0244 .0057 .0096  .0602 .0130  .0206
in region (yrs)  (3.2)  (1.6)  (1.4)  (11.0)  (3.6)  (3.1)
 The GSS and DDB ask slightly different questions about social trust, and scale 
their results differently, raising difﬁ  culties for exact comparisons. The GSS asks a 
standard question used in many social science surveys: “Generally speaking, would 
you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing 
with people?” The DDB’s simpler question asks respondents to record their agreement 
or disagreement, on a six-point scale, to the statement “Most people are honest”. We 
present two sets of results using the DDB data, one based on the six point scale, con-
verted so that 1.0 represents full agreement and 0 complete disagreement, and the 
second converted to a binary equivalent, with any form of agreement being given the 
value 1.0, and any form of disagreement the value of zero. The second form is more 
directly comparable with the GSS binary coding, which uses the value 1.0 for agree-
ment that most people can be trusted and 0 for agreement with the alternative that 
you can’t be too careful. As might be expected, there are more afﬁ  rmative answers 
to the DDB question than to the GSS, since the GSS offers an alternative that many 
may agree with more strongly than they accept general trustworthiness.8 
The equations in Table 1 show separately the effects of own-education and aver-
age education, both measured in years, on the GSS and two DDB measures of social 
trust. Equations (i) through (iii) show the education effects based on a fully speciﬁ  ed 
model attempting to account for a number of other factors that have been found to 
inﬂ  uence social trust, while equations (iv) through (vi) present results from a much 
cruder model including only education, average education, and a linear time trend.9 
Both models show positive effects from both own and average education levels for 
all three measures of social trust. These positive effects are very large and highly 
signiﬁ  cant in the simple model, and smaller and weaker in the fully speciﬁ  ed models, 
presumably because the larger models contain a number of other variables that share 
some of the same regional and time series variation as average education.10 In the 
simple models, the effects of average education on trust are about twice as large as 
those from own-education, echoing the earlier results of NJS-B for tolerance. In the 
fuller models they are about half as large. Using the GSS results shown in the ﬁ  rst 8 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
equation, each additional year of education increases one’s likelihood of being trusting 
by .044, or just over 10 percent of the average likelihood of .38. A one-year increase 
in the average level of education in one’s region increases one’s trust by .024. Thus 
increases in average education levels, acting both through own-effects and education 
levels in the surrounding community, have had strong positive effects on social trust 
over the past twenty years. With average education increasing by almost 1.5 years 
from the mid-1970s to the late 1990s, the implied impact on trust is about .1, an in-
crease equal to almost one-quarter of the average level of trust on the mid-1970s, and 
almost as large as the entire drop since that time. Thus the effects of changes over 
time in average education levels double the size of the decline in trust to be explained 
by other factors. 
We turn now to consider the results for participation. First we shall compare the 
GSS and DDB results for some key forms of participation, and then present the GSS 
results for sixteen different types of organization. Table 2 shows the education results 
from both fully speciﬁ  ed and simple models for total memberships from the GSS, plus 
three key types of social engagement as measured by the DDB surveys. These DDB 
participation measures represent the number of times that the respondent reports 
participating in each of these activities in the previous year: (1) attend a club meet-
ing, (2) work on a community project, (3) give or attend a dinner party. For three out 
of four measures of social engagement, own-education has a strongly positive effect, 
and average education levels, where signiﬁ  cant, are positive. The only estimated 
negative effect of average education levels is for total memberships from the GSS 
survey. Even there the estimated negative effect of average education levels is small 
and insigniﬁ  cant. This is in sharp contrast to the NJS-B [1996, 247] results for GSS 
total memberships. They report an own-education effect of +.20, fairly close to our 
estimate of +.23. However, for average education, they ﬁ  nd a signiﬁ  cant negative effect 
of -.24, while our negative effect is only one-tenth as large, and is insigniﬁ  cant. Since 
the explanation of this difference is a primary aim of this paper, it will be treated 
separately, in the next section.
The DDB equations provide further and independent conﬁ  rmation of the general 
lack of relative education effects, since all of the four types of activity show positive 
effects from average education levels, two of them with statistical signiﬁ  cance. The 
DDB participation measures are in some ways preferable to the GSS data, since the 
latter show only the number of types of organization to which the individual belongs, 
and not the extent of involvement. The DDB data, by contrast, ask for the frequency 
of involvement in each of the types of activity. The sample size is also much larger 
for DDB, although in both surveys the range of years covered, and the number of 
respondents in each year is large enough, that small sample size is not likely to be 
a problem.
Comparing the results for the GSS and DDB equations is made more complicated 
by the different form of the questions and coding. The coefﬁ  cients are generally higher 
for the DDB responses, but then so are the average values for the participation mea-
sures. To get a rough measure of the extent to which the proportionate responses 
are similar, the coefﬁ  cients shown in the table should be divided by the sample av-
erages for the dependent variables, as shown at the bottom of Table 2. With these 
adjustments made, the effects of own education are quite similar across the types 9 EDUCATION AND SOCIAL CAPITAL
of involvement. A one-year increase in education leads to an estimated increase in 
participation ranging from 9 percent for number of dinner parties to 14 percent for 
number of involvements in community projects. The effects of average education are 
more varied, and much less precisely estimated. An increase of one year in the aver-
age level of education in one’s region increases the number of dinner parties given or 
attended by 20 percent, increases the involvement in community projects by 5 percent , 
has no effect on club meetings attended, and reduces the number of memberships (the 
GSS variable) by about 1 percent.
 TABLE  2
  GSS and DDB Evidence on Social Engagement
Equation (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)   
 GSS  DDB  DDB  DDB   
  1974-94 1975-97 1975-97 1975-97 
Sample  19214 71246 71246 71246   
Dependent variable:  Number of  Club meetings  Community  Dinner 
 memberships  (times/year)  projects  parties
A. Results from Full Equations with control variables.
Education in years  .2283  .7141  .3504  .4808
  (51.7) (36.1) (33.5) (41.5)   
Average education  -.0201  .0057  .1710  .9600
in region (years)  (0.7)  (0.1)  (1.7)  (8.7)   
B. Results from Simple Equations including only education variables and a time trend.
Education in years  .2286  .6167  .3273  .4313
  (51.8) (31.4) (31.6) (37.4)   
Average education  -.0362  .0979  .1344  1.227
in region (years)  (1.1)  (0.5)  (1.4)  (11.4)   
Mean of dep variable  1.78  7.46  2.25  5.32
We turn to Table 3 to consider the effects of education on memberships in the 
sixteen different types of organization covered by the GSS memberships question. The 
dependent variable for each of the sixteen equations is equal to the fraction of the 
respondents saying they were a member of an organization of the type mentioned. The 
ﬁ  gure for total memberships is the sum of the answers for the sixteen types. Given 
the linear regressions used, it follows that the coefﬁ  cients for total memberships 
are simply the sums of the coefﬁ  cients on the same variable in each of the sixteen 
categories. Thus the equations for the different types of membership show where the 
aggregate effects are coming from.
Inspection of the results for speciﬁ  c groups shows how hard it is to generalize across 
groups with very different purposes, recruiting methods, advantages to members, and 
degree of commitment required of members. Own-education effects are positive for 
all forms of membership except for unions. The proportionate own-education effects 
are largest, unsurprisingly, for professional organizations, since such organizations 
generally have advanced education as prerequisites for membership. The negative 
own-education effect for union membership follows from similar reasoning, since 
unionization rates are generally higher on the shop ﬂ  oor than in management posi-
tions, while educational qualiﬁ  cations follow a reverse pattern. 10 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Average education effects are generally small and insigniﬁ  cant. Signiﬁ  cant positive 
effects for average education are estimated for literary groups, a ﬁ  nding foreshadowed 
by our earlier discussion. A book group is more likely to be formed, and to offer a links 
to other readers with similar interests, where average education levels are higher, 
and there seems to be no reason to think that the social structure sets any upper limit 
to the number of book groups. Average education effects are also positive for sports 
groups, although signiﬁ  cantly so only in the simple form of the equation.
 TABLE  3
  Effects of Absolute and Relative Education on Types of Membership
    Full Equation      Simple Equation
Column (i) (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v)  (vi)
Membership
type Educ  Aved  P-value  Educ  Aved  P-value
Fraternal .0155 .0003  .0002  .0110  .0017  .0003
 (21.6)  (0.7)    (15.7)  (0.5)
Service .0187  -.0031  .0026  .0170  -.0066  .0026
 (25.5)  (0.6)    (24.3)  (1.9)
Veterans .0034  -.0054  .6407  .0004  -.0057  .0799
 (5.3)  (1.2)    (0.6)  (1.8)
Political .0092  .0006  .0000  .0079  .0028  .0000
 (18.9)  (0.2)    (17.1)  (1.2)
Union -.0054  -.0217  .0000  -.0031  .0337  .0000
 (6.4)  (3.6)    (3.7)  (8.1)
Sport .0171  .0128  .0000  .0230  .0179  .0000
 (17.6)  (1.8)    (24.5)  (3.8)
Youth .0093  .0075  .0017  .0127  -.0009  .0010
 (12.3)  (1.4)    (17.5)  (0.2)
School .0178  -.0021  .0083  .0218  -.0196  .5825
 (21.1)  (0.3)    (26.7)  (4.8)
Hobby .0113  .0014  .0137  .0105  -.0056  .1533
 (15.5)  (0.3)    (15.2)  (1.6)
Greek .0174  -.0052  .0009  .0166  -.0125  .0957
 (33.3)  (1.4)    (35.5)  (5.0)   
National .0059  .0044  .0013  .0051  .0047  .0000
 (13.1)  (1.3)    (11.9)  (2.2)
Farm .0018  -.0081  .0719  .0011  -.0097  .0002
 (3.8)  (2.3)    (2.3)  (4.1)
Literary .0217  .0154  .0000  .0195  .0094  .0000
 (31.6)  (3.2)    (29.8)  (2.8)
Professional .0515  .0070  .0000  .0500  -.0078  .0000
 (65.3)  (1.2)    (66.7)  (2.1)
Church .0233  -.0415  .0278  .0155  -.0844  .0000
 (20.1)  (5.0)    (13.6)  (14.8)
Other .0100  .0013  .0300  .0075  .0111  .0000 
 (13.5)  (0.3)    (10.7)  (3.1)   
Total memberships  .2286  -.0362  .0000  .2165  -.0716  .0003
Total (51.8)  (1.1)    (51.1)  (3.3)
Notes: The full equations (i) to (iii) include the same independent variables as the equations shown in 
Table 2, except that the variable for year is excluded, and ﬁ  xed effects are added for each year. The simple 
equations (iv) to (vi) include only education and average education, plus ﬁ  xed effects for each year.
 
Average education effects are signiﬁ  cantly negative only for unions, church 
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simple equations. The relative education hypothesis does not apply easily to the 
union and church group cases. For unions, both the own and the average education 
effects are negative, presumably for the same reason, with lower average education 
providing the greater critical mass needed for successful working-class organization. 
For church groups, the negative effect from average education exceeds the positive 
effect from own education, suggesting that regions (and time periods) with higher 
average education levels also have lower average ratios of church membership, though 
we doubt that this is attributable to the social competition emphasized by NJS-B. 
For farm and school groups, the negative effect of average education may reﬂ  ect the   
sorting effect emphasized by NJS-B, or perhaps some burden sharing of the sort we 
have described earlier. Some farm groups may represent professional organizations 
in which membership is simply part of being in the business, with a negative average 
education effect reﬂ  ecting in part differences in average education levels in census 
regions with different concentrations in agriculture.
UNRAVELLING THE PUZZLING CONTRAST
Why do our results for average education differ so much from those of NJS-B? The 
differences could be due to estimation method, sample size, choice of control variables, 
or differences in the deﬁ  nition of average education. We shall show below that the 
differences are entirely due to differences in the deﬁ  nitions of average education. In 
any equation using our deﬁ  nition of average education, the NJS-B negative effect of 
average education disappears. This happens whether we use their control variables, 
our alternative control variables, or simple equations with no control variables. Al-
though we use the same corrected GSS data for total memberships used by NJS-B, 
our control variables differ somewhat from theirs, and their sample size is about 15 
percent smaller. Their smaller sample size (15887 compared to 19214) is due to the 
unavailability of data for some of their control variables. We have tried to include only 
control variables that are available for almost the full sample, while testing to see if 
allowing for other control variables available only for some of the data (e.g. parents’ 
education) makes any difference to the fundamental results. There are some slight 
differences in the statistical methods used. We include, in the Table 2 equation for 
GSS memberships, a linear time trend, while NJS-B use a more general method by 
inserting separate dummy variables for all but one of the individual years. To see 
if the different method of allowing for year effects has any impact on the education 
results, we have re-estimated equation (i) of Table 2 using year ﬁ  xed effects instead 
of a linear time trend. The resulting coefﬁ  cients for education and average education 
are shown in the last row of Table 3. As can be seen, the education coefﬁ  cients are 
unaffected. If the results did differ, the NJS-B allowance for year ﬁ  xed effects would 
be preferred to what we do in Table 2, since it is a more general statistical method. 
We include both sets of results to show they are identical, and use the linear time 
trend elsewhere in Tables 1 and 2, since we are interested in showing the extent to 
which trust and social engagement are changing through time, with and without 
controlling for other variables.
To provide a more deﬁ  nitive answer to the puzzle, we have drawn a sample of data 
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in the context of three different equations: ﬁ  rst using their control variables, then 
using ours, and ﬁ  nally using a simple model containing only education, average educa-
tion, and ﬁ  xed effects for each survey year.11 We have then estimated these equations 
using the NJS-B measure of average education, our measure, and two intermediate 
measures designed to show which of the differences play the most important roles in 
explaining the puzzle. All these results are shown in Table 4.
 TABLE  4
 Total GSS Memberships with Differing Measures of Average Education
 (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)
  Static peer group  Static peer group  Dynamic peer group  Dynamic peers
  National average  Regional average  National average  Regional average
  (NJS-B measure)      (Our measure)
Using the NJS-B
control variables
Education .2058  .2068  .2007  .2006 
 (37.6)  (37.5)  (36.8)  (36.5)
Average education  -.2001  -.1188  .0174  .0021
 (8.6)  (6.6)  (0.2)  (0.1)
Using the Helliwell and   
Putnam control variables
Education .2333  .2343  .2323  .2335 
 (45.8)  (45.7)  (45.7)  (45.5)
Average education  -.2648  -.0941  .4699  -.0478
 (2.3)  (2.5)  (2.6)  (1.3)
Simple equation with year effects 
but no other controls
Education .2404  .2446  .2216  .2239 
 (48.0)  (48.1)  (45.1)  (44.8)
Average education  -.2118  -.1911  -.1949  -.0826
 (16.4)  (16.2)  (1.8)  (3.2)
As noted above, NJS-B deﬁ  ne the educational environment as the national aver-
age of education years of those who reached the age of 25 in the same year as the 
respondent, or in any of the 24 preceding years. In our view, this is too broad in being 
national rather than regional, and too unresponsive to the changing environment, by 
excluding all those who are younger than the respondent while continuing to include 
many who are dead and gone. We deﬁ  ne average education as the average number 
of years of education of currently surveyed adults in the same census regions, argu-
ing that this best represents the social environment which the individual is deciding 
whether to trust and join. Our measure thus uses a changing regional peer group while 
NJS-B use a static national reference group. The results for education and average 
education based on the NJS-B deﬁ  nition are shown in column (i) of Table 4. To help 
show the inﬂ  uence of the two differences between our deﬁ  nition and that of NJS-B, 
we have also deﬁ  ned two mid-way variables, one using a static regional peer group 
and the other a dynamic national peer group. These results are shown in columns 
(ii) and (iii) of Table 4, while the results from our variable, which employs a dynamic 
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The three panels of results, moving from top to bottom in Table 4, make use of 
the NJS-B control variables, our control variables, and no control variables. All equa-
tions include year ﬁ  xed effects. The ﬁ  rst important conclusion from the results is that 
the negative effect of average education falls sharply moving from left to right in the 
table, whatever control variables are used in the equation. Looking ﬁ  rst at the top 
panel, using the NJS-B control variables, the negative average education effect falls 
almost in half using a static regional peer group, and disappears entirely with either 
a dynamic national or a dynamic regional peer group. Using our control variables, 
as shown in the middle panel, the negative effect of average education falls by more 
than half with a static regional peer group, becomes positive with a dynamic national 
peer group and is insigniﬁ  cantly negative with the dynamic regional peer group. 
In the simple equation, with no controls, the negative effect of average education 
remains strong with the static regional peer group. It is still large, but statistically 
weak, with the dynamic national peer group, and drops to one-third the size of the 
own-education effect when our dynamic regional measure is used. As may be recalled 
from Table 3, the negative average education effect in the simple equation for total 
memberships can be traced to church membership. This explains why the negative 
average education effect disappears in the fully speciﬁ  ed NJS-B equation, but not in 
the simple equation, since the NJS-B control variables include church attendance 
with a strong positive coefﬁ  cient. 
Thus we can conclude that in either of the fully speciﬁ  ed models the negative ef-
fects of average education on GSS memberships disappear when the static national 
peer group is replaced by a dynamic regional one, with the shift from a static to a 
dynamic reference group being the most important part of the story.
CONCLUSION
We have presented a range of data designed to show the effects of education on 
trust and social engagement, two key variables often used as measures of social capital. 
We have paid special attention to the relative education hypothesis of NJS-B, who 
report evidence suggesting that only relative education is likely to inﬂ  uence political 
and social engagement. For trust, our results support their ﬁ  ndings for tolerance, 
with increases in own-education and average education both leading to signiﬁ  cant 
increases in social trust. 
For several measures of social engagement, our results differ signiﬁ  cantly from 
those of NJS-B, and are much more optimistic about the social beneﬁ  ts of increases 
in the width and depth of education. We ﬁ  nd no systematic evidence that increases 
in average education have any negative effects on participation, let alone of the size 
required to offset the large positive effects of own-education. Since we prefer our deﬁ  -
nition on theoretical grounds in both respects in which it differs from theirs, we are 
inclined to put more weight on our results. Our tables show conﬁ  rming results from 
two large US surveys. Since the preparation of the ﬁ  rst version of this paper, we have 
been involved with several new surveys measuring the nature and consequences of 
social capital in the United States, Canada, and other countries. We have recently used 
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[2005]) to conﬁ  rm the same pattern of generally positive contextual effects reported 
in this paper. We also now have even ﬁ  ner contextual measures of education, even 
to the level of the census tract, and we usually ﬁ  nd, as we had previously surmised, 
that these are even more relevant than the broader contextual measures. We are thus 
able to be even more conﬁ  dent that rising general levels of education are likely to be 
accompanied by higher general levels of political and social engagement. This means 
that the answer to the Brody [1978] puzzle about declining political participation in 
America must lie elsewhere12. 
 
 APPENDIX
Although the focus of this paper is on the effects of education and the educational 
environment, it may be helpful to provide some explanation of the control variables 
used in the fuller models for trust and participation. The control variables used by 
NJS-B for their membership equation are fully described by them, and the coefﬁ  cients 
are reported in NJS-B [1996, 247]. The variables and coefﬁ  cients from our alternative 
control variables are shown in Tables A1 and A2. The following paragraphs explain 
the variables and their effects on trust and participation.
 The TV generation variable is a measure of the likely exposure to television dur-
ing an individual’s formative years, designed to enable a speciﬁ  c test of the negative 
link between television and social capital put forward by Putnam [1995b; 2000]. For 
each individual, the value taken by the variable is equal to the fraction of a person's 
pre-adult years (from birth to twenty) during which they were potentially exposed to 
television, weighted by a measure of the availability of television derived from data 
showing the increases in U.S. television ownership from almost zero in 1950 to over 
90 percent in 1959. The TV generation variable takes a value of 1.0 for all those born 
since the late 1950s, and zero for all those born before 1930, with intermediate values 
for those born in the intervening period. The GSS results suggest that someone brought 
up before television has a trust level that is higher by .07, or almost 20 percent, com-
pared to someone exposed to television throughout his or her formative years.
The TV era variable is the average value of the TV generation variable for all 
other current respondents in the same census region. It thus relates to the individual 
TV generation variable exactly as the average education variable relates to the in-
dividual measure of education. Exposure to television, like educational attainment, 
may have relative, additive or super-additive effects. The results for trust provide 
some evidence of super-additive effects, with the explanation presumably being the 
same as for education. If watching television makes individuals less trusting, then it 
is less rational to be trusting in an environment where many others have also been 
subject to the same inﬂ  uences. Whether this is in fact the appropriate explanation for 
the correlation between the TV-related variables and social trust is an issue that we 
leave aside here, since our primary purpose now is to explore the effects of relative 
and absolute education.
Lifecycle is a variable equal to the absolute value of the difference between one's 
age and 40. It is intended to capture a possible cohort effect in memberships, with 
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It is to be interpreted jointly with the age effect, as the two coefﬁ  cients together de-
termine the relative sizes of the participation changes before and after the age of 40. 
It is included in the equation to ensure that the TV generation variable is not taking 
credit or blame for the combination of a cohort effect and a population bulge working 
its way through the demographic structure. The lifecycle and age variables combine to 
provide a two-part age effect, with separate slopes, and possibly separate signs, before 
and after the age of forty. In the GSS equation for trust, the coefﬁ  cient on lifecycle is 
negative and much larger than the positive coefﬁ  cient on age. Putting the two together 
implies that trust rises with each year of age (by .0283+.0037=.0320) until the age of 
40, and then falls with each year of age thereafter (by .0283-.0037=.0245). 
The year variable is the year during which the survey took place. A negative coef-
ﬁ  cient implies that trust was falling through time after accounting for any effects of 
changing demographic structure, education and any other included variables, such 
as the extent of likely exposure to television. As already noted, it takes a signiﬁ  cant 
negative coefﬁ  cient in all the trust equations, with larger and more signiﬁ  cant effects 
in the simpler equations. 
The variable male takes the value 1.0 if the respondent is male, and zero other-
wise. The GSS results suggest that males are signiﬁ  cantly more trusting than females, 
while the DDB results show the reverse. How can this discrepancy be explained? 
Fortunately, there is additional evidence that helps to unravel this puzzle. In 1983 
the GSS sample was split in two, with half asked the usual question, and the other 
half asked the simpler question “Generally, would you say that most people can be 
trusted?” Both males and females were more likely to answer yes to the simpler ques-
tion, but the difference was far greater for females than for males. The difference is 
so great that females are signiﬁ  cantly more trusting than males if asked the simpler 
question, but signiﬁ  cantly less so when asked the question with the alternative “You 
can’t be too careful”. The implication would appear to be that females are more cau-
tious than males, but are also more inclined to think others to be trustworthy. Thus it 
would appear that the difference in gender effects between the GSS and DDB surveys 
is sufﬁ  ciently explained by the difference between the forms of the question, without 
settling the question of whether there are gender differences in perceptions of honesty 
and trustworthiness.  
The variable divorced takes the value of 1.0 for every respondent reporting their 
marital status as divorced. The results show that divorced persons, in either the GSS 
or DDB results, are signiﬁ  cantly less trusting. An alternative family status variable, 
used by NJS-B, takes the value of 1.0 for persons so describing their marital status. 
The two variables give very similar results, with a slight empirical preference for the 
married version. This suggests that single and widowed individuals have trust levels 
that are closer to those of divorced persons than of those who are currently married, a 
presumption that is supported by more speciﬁ  c tests. The choice of which variable to 
use for family status has no effect on the estimates of the effects of education. The same 
is true for various variables reﬂ  ecting ethnic differences in trust and participation.
There are two regional dummy variables in the equation. West North Central 
takes the value 1.0 for all respondents in the WNC census region. The variable south 
takes the value of 1.0 for all respondents in the South Atlantic, East South Central and 
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lower in the south, than elsewhere in the country, even after allowing for differences in 
education, demography and exposure to television. These are the only regional effects 
that were found to be systematically present in the trust and membership data, with 
south being important only for trust and for some individual membership categories, 
but not for total memberships.
 TABLE  A1
  Comparing GSS and DDB Evidence on Social Trust
  Full results including control variables
Equation (i)  (ii)  (iii) (iv) (v)  (vi) 
 GSS  DDB  DDB  GSS  DDB  DDB
 1972-96  1975-97  1975-97  1972-96  1975-97  1975-97
Sample 22445  76156  76156  22445  76156  76156
Dependent variable: Trust  Honest  Honest  Trust  Honest  Honest
     (binary)      (binary)
Education in years  .0439  .0093  .0175  .0391  .0062  .0133
 (40.3)  (24.4)  (24.8)  (37.0)  (16.0)  (18.7)
Average education  .0244  .0057  .0096  .0602  .0130  .0206
in region (yrs)  (3.2)  (1.6)  (1.4)  (11.0)  (3.6)  (3.1)
TV generation  -.0700  -.0168  -.0403
 (3.3)  (2.6)  (3.4)
TV era (average  -.0583  -.0646  -.0514
of TVgen in region)  (0.7)  (2.1)  (0.9)
Lifecycle -.0282  -.00098  -.0022
 (6.5)  (7.1)  (8.9)
Age .0037  .00398  .00576 
 (6.8)  (21.4)  (16.7)
Year -.0071  -.0033  -.0054  -.0120  -.0048  -.0073
 (4.4)  (5.2)  (4.6)  (20.8)  (22.0)  (18.1)
Divorced -.061  -.0415  -0683
 (5.0)  (10.9)  (9.7)
WNC Region  .102  .020  .0358
 (8.4)  (6.0)  (5.6)
South -.051  -.0209  -.0358
 (6.4)  (10.3)  (9.5)
Male .033  -.013  -.025 
 (5.4)  (7.1)  (7.4)
R2 .1074  .0758  .0517  .0754  .0135  .0110
SEE .466  .248  .460  .475  .256.  .470
 
The previous discussion has related mainly to the GSS results. The pattern of 
the DDB results is very similar, except for the gender difference already analysed. 
Comparing the size of the effects is made more difﬁ  cult by the differences in the form 
of the two questions and the gradation of the answers. The DDB trust variable is 
explained in two ways, once coded as a fraction, and again converted to a binary form 
similar to that used for the GSS question. The fractional version gives a more precise 
equation, suggesting that the shades of agreement or disagreement are explained 
by the same variables used in explaining the binary choice, and this information is 
suppressed in the binary coding. Comparing the binary form of the DDB equation 
with the GSS equation, the standard error of the estimate is very similar (about 
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equation. The implication of this is that there is more variance of the explanatory 
variables among the GSS than among the DDB respondents. This would be the case 
if, for example, the techniques used to select the DDB sample had the effect of pro-
ducing more homogeneity than is found in the GSS sample or in the population as 
a whole. This appears to be so, as the DDB sample has fewer divorced persons, and 
less variance in its distribution of both age and education. Thus the GSS sample has 
more variance in its dependent variable, and in its key independent variables. This 
explains why the explained variance is higher for the GSS sample. The fact that the 
unexplained variance is the same suggests that whatever is missing from the model 
is found equally in the GSS and DDB samples.
  TABLE A2
  GSS and DDB Evidence on Social Engagement
  Full results including control variables
Equation (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)
 GSS  DDB  DDB  DDB 
 1975-97  1975-97  1975-97  1975-97
Sample  19214 71246 71246 71246
Dependent variable:  Number of  Club meets  Comm   Dinner 
 memberships  (times/yr)  projects  parties
Education in years  .2283  .7141  .3504  .4808
  (51.7) (36.1) (33.5) (41.5)   
Average education  -.0201  .0057  .1710  .9600
in region (yrs)  (0.7)  (0.1)  (1.7)  (8.7)   
TV  generation  -.5646 -.3000 -.3243 -.5206
  (6.1) (0.9) (1.8) (2.7)
TV era (average  -1.067  -2.988  -1.565  -1.768
of TVgen in region)  (3.2)  (2.0)  (2.0)  (2.0)
Lifecycle  -.0085 -.0475 -.0289 .0153
  (4.4) (6.7) (7.7) (3.7)
Age  .0031 .1404 .0422 .0305
  (1.2) (14.5) (8.2) (5.4)
Year  -.0138 -.2311 -.0428 -.1746
  (2.1) (7.4) (2.6) (9.5)
Divorced  -.2434 -.7877 -.3816 -1.039
  (4.8) (4.0) (3.7) (9.0)
WNC  Region  .290 1.106 .361 -.077
  (5.8) (6.2) (3.8) (0.7)
South -.034  -.531  .080  -.755
  (0.9) (5.0) (1.4)  (12.2)
Male .238  -1.934  -.508  -1.051
 (9.4)  (20.5)  (10.2)  (19.0)
R2  .1469 .0594 .0265 .0576
Turning to the participation results in Table A2, we see that the control variables 
tend to have signiﬁ  cant effects, of the same sign, for all four measures of social in-
volvement. The negative effects of TV exposure on participation, which are strong for 
the GSS membership variable, are less strong for the DDB measures of participation. 
The negative effects of average exposure to TV are fairly similar across the categories, 
and larger than the estimated effects of individual exposure. Males are more involved 
in some types of GSS memberships, but are signiﬁ  cantly less intensively involved 18 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
in any of the three DDB measures of social engagement. Participation is greater in 
the WNC census region (except for dinner parties) and lower in the south (except for 
involvement in community projects). 
  NOTES
  The authors wish to thank the editors for their patience and good advice, and Haifang Huang and 
Josh Bolian for their assistance with the new empirical results referred to in this updated version of 
the paper. The delays are entirely ours.
1.  Campbell [2006] includes both own and contextual levels of education in his analysis of data for a 
number of European countries, with the contextual level of education deﬁ  ned by nation and age cohort. 
His results generally favour the absolute model over the relative and cumulative alternatives. There 
are two main exceptions: relative education is dominant for his ‘zero sum’ forms of political engage-
ment, while the cumulative model is strongly preferred for general social trust.
2.  Logically, of course, the appropriate standard of comparison might be even more local; indeed, we 
suspect that it is. Our purpose here, however, is merely to show that even slightly narrowing the 
spatial standard of comparison (moving from national to regional standards) can substantially affect 
one’s conclusions. A fortiori deﬁ  ning more localized standards of comparison should improve estimates 
still further, although at some point, an increasingly localized deﬁ  nition might in fact become smaller 
than the real range of externalities. For example, although we considered using state- or county-level 
standards in the present analysis, we set that aside out of concern that some externalities might be 
carried by inter-county or even inter-state commuters. Interregional commuting is vanishingly small. 
In subsequent work using “relative education,” we recommend that sensitivity testing be done to as-
sess the most suitable level of aggregation, but however low that turns out to be, it will, we believe, 
be smaller than the nation as a whole.
3.  Again, of course, this implementation could be tuned more ﬁ  nely to ﬁ  t speciﬁ  c models of civic competi-
tion. Our claim is merely that it is more plausible than a purely static, backward-looking model.
4.  A close approximation to the NJS-B measure of educational environment, measured in average years 
of education, is provided by edenv= 9.0 +.07273*yob -.03333*(yob-55)*d55, where d55 is a variable 
that takes the value 1.0 where yob>55, and zero elsewhere. The equation is thus piecewise liner with 
a kink at yob=55. The national average level of education thus rises by .073 for each year of birth up 
to 1955, and at .04 (=.073-.033) per year for years of birth after 1955, as shown in Table F3 of NJS-B 
[1996, 232] 
5.  The authors argue that the negative effect from average education levels “...represents decreasing 
marginal returns for additional education rather than indicating increased competition.” NJS-B [1996, 
162]. 
6.  The GSS participation results cover 1974 through 1994 only, because the membership questions were 
not asked in the 1972 and 1996 surveys.
7.  The use of a reference group based on the current adult population also has the advantage that the 
change in the sample average level of own-education from year to year is equal to the corresponding 
change in the educational environment. 
8.  The DDB results are very similar to the results of a 1983 GSS experimental form that offered only 
the trusting alternative. 
9.  The nature and estimated effects of the control variables are reported in the Appendix. The coefﬁ  cients 
reported are from the linear probability model estimated by OLS. The normality of residuals assumed 
in OLS regression is false, since the dependent variable falls into the range between 0 and 1. We used 
logit estimation of the binary equations to see if non-normality of the residuals is affecting the results. 
Logit estimation of the equations with binary dependent variables, with coefﬁ  cients renormalized to 
be comparable with those from the linear probability model, shows no change in the pattern of results. 
For example, the transformed logit coefﬁ  cients for education and average education in equation (i) are 
.050 (t=37.1) and .027 (t=3.1), and in equation (iv) .044 (t=34.9) and .067 (t=11.2). These are almost 
identical to those shown in Table 1. 
10.  Similarly, the time trend coefﬁ  cients are larger and much more signiﬁ  cant in the simpler model than 
in the fully speciﬁ  ed model. This is as we would hope, as one of the objectives of fuller speciﬁ  cation 19 EDUCATION AND SOCIAL CAPITAL
is to expose the underlying reasons for the downward trends in social trust. A fully speciﬁ  ed model 
would leave little or nothing to be explained by time alone, in the absence of some theory suggesting 
why the passage of time should be sufﬁ  cient to erode social trust. The simpler model includes the time 
trend to ensure that any effects found for average education levels are not simply due to the fact that 
it shares a common time trend with some important excluded variables.
11.  Our replication of the NJS-B equation does not yet provide an exact match, although the results for 
education and average education are so close to theirs that full replication is not likely to change the 
pattern of results. We have approximated the NJS-B measure of relative education by modelling it 
as a piece-wise linear function of year of birth, with a kink at 1955, as shown in Table F-3 of NJS-B 
[1996, 232]. Our current equation includes all of the other variables they use, except that hours worked 
are not included, since the number of valid observations in the GSS database is several thousand less 
than the NJS-B sample of 15887. Our current equation has a sample size of 18037.
12.  But see the Appendix for some results suggesting that the prevalence of television during one’s child-
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